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This paper uses data from NBER surveys of over 40,000 employees in hundreds of facilities in 14
firms and from employees on the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys to explore how shared compensation
affects turnover, absenteeism, loyalty, worker effort, and other outcomes affecting workplace performance.
  The empirical analysis shows that shared capitalism has beneficial effects on all outcomes save for
absenteeism and that it has its strongest effects on turnover, loyalty, and worker effort when it is combined
with:  a) high-performance work policies (employee involvement, training, and job security), b) low
levels of supervision, and c) fixed wages that are at or above market level.  Most workers report that
cash incentives, stock options, ESOP stock, and ESPP participation motivate them to work harder.
 The interaction of the effects of shared capitalism with other corporate policies suggests that the various
shared capitalist and other policies may operate through a latent variable, "corporate culture".
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Cooperation aims to increase the margin from which the increment of gain is to be drawn. It 
makes industry more productive; it gives the employer somewhat more, and to the laborer 
much more than they now receive…All the workmen with their employers constitute 
collectively an exceptionally good entrepreneur...  The survival of full cooperation in the 
long rivalry of systems depends on its power to excel other systems …If in the comparison 
with other systems, it is shown that it ought to survive, it will do so, and that regardless of 
initial failures -- John Bates Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth 1886 
 
  
  One hundred twenty years ago John Bates Clark, one of the founders of the American 
Economic Association, developer of marginal productivity theory, and the person for whom the 
prestigious Bates Clark Award is named, developed a vision of shared capitalism – the cooperative 
plan -- and laid out a key test for this form of capitalist enterprise, its ability to survive in 
competition with other forms.  In his 1886 book The Philosophy of Wealth, Clark said that he 
wanted “to take the workman permanently out of the position in which his gain is his employer’s 
loss” through profit sharing and stock ownership by the workers.  His solution to workers’ risk 
aversion and lack of credit and personal funds to invest in capital was that the firm would pay profit 
shares to workers in the form of stock, which would make profit sharing a gradual vehicle for 
employee ownership.
1  Clark underlined the need for skilled management and committed investors 
and stressed that access to new capital investment was critical to the success of such enterprises.  He 
also noted the need for a cooperative management culture in these corporations.  Clark’s views 
suggest that forms of shared capitalism that combine profit sharing and employee ownership 
without personal worker financing in a cooperative corporate setting would positively affect 
workplace performance and company success.  Clark’s interest in shared capitalism was mirrored in 
                                                 
1 Adam Smith (1776 ) credited the incentive of shared capitalism with improved economic performance for the French 
Metayers or sharecroppers where the owner of the land and the sharecropper divided the produce equally after capital 
investments: “Such tenants, being freemen, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the 
produce of the land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order that their 
own proportion may be so” (quoted in  Laffont and Martimort 2002: 10).  He stressed that sharecroppers would  not risk 
their own capital to improve the proprietor’s land without offering any resolution to this problem.    
  
2 
the first volume of the American Economic Review, which contained extensive articles on 
cooperative economic relations in New England and Minneapolis in issues 4 and 5.
2 
This paper analyzes the relationship of various forms of shared capitalist compensation to 
six workplace outcomes—turnover, absenteeism, perceived effort of co-workers, loyalty to the firm, 
willingness to work hard, and frequency of worker suggestions to improve productivity—from the 
perspective of the “John Bates Clark vision” of shared capitalism.  We also examine employee 
responses to questions about their response to shared capitalist incentives.  Our analysis uses two 
datasets:  one from the 2002 and 2006 General Social Surveys (GSS), which cover 2430 persons in 
for-profit firms from a nationally representative sample; and an NBER sponsored firm based survey 
of 41,206 employees at 320 worksites in 14 companies for whom profit/gain sharing, a wide variety 
of employee ownership vehicles, and broad-based stock options are a key part of their compensation 
systems.  We conducted the NBER survey over the 2001-2006 period, adding firms as they agreed 
to participate.  We began our survey by selecting companies that varied in size, industry, and type 
of shared capitalism program, but our final sample is non-representative.  Many firms refused our 
requests to run the survey; and we lost two large firms, which had agreed to participate, when other 
firms bought them and decided against conducting the planned survey.  Once a firm agreed to have 
our research group administer the survey, we either ran the survey on all or a random sample of 
employees, with an average response rate of 53% across the 14 companies.  Thus, the survey can be 
                                                 
2 Issue 4 included a 100-page article “Cooperation in a Western City” by Albert Shaw about such enterprises in 
Minneapolis, which examined profit sharing by Charles Pillsbury in his mills and included an interview with Pillsbury.  
Issue 5 had a 129 page article “Cooperation in the Northeast” by Edward Bemis on Massachusetts companies.  In the 
1880s a group of doctoral students was assembled at Johns Hopkins University who divided up the United States into 
regions and studied forms of profit sharing and employee ownership in these regions. The University published these 
studies as a book (Adams 1888).  John Bates Clark worked closely with this group of researchers, several of whose 
articles appeared in the new journal of the American Economic Association.  Clark's views were similar to those of 
another prominent 19
th century economist, John Stuart Mill, who said “The form of association which if mankind 
continues to improve must be expected in the end to predominate is not that which can exist between a capitalist as 
chief and workpeople without a voice in the management but the association of the labourers themselves on terms of 
equality, collectively owning the capital with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected 
and removable by themselves” (John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Books III-V and Appendices [1848], 
in J.M. Robson, ed., Collective Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 3. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965, p. 775).    
3 
viewed as a random sample of workers from a non-random sample of firms. The survey included 
core questions common across all companies, and some questions of special interest or relevance to 
that company.  Six company surveys were conducted entirely by web, seven company surveys were 
done on paper, and one survey was done using both the web and paper surveys.  A total of 41,206 
respondents provided usable surveys.  Appendix A describes the variables used in this analysis.   
 
The Clark vision in modern eyes 
Modern theorists concerned with shared capitalism highlight the potential of corporate 
culture in helping unify ownership and control with minimal agency costs and enabling shared 
capitalism to fulfill its potential.  In his 2000 address to the Industrial Relations Research 
Association, Joseph Stiglitz defined the goal of shared capitalism as “to increase each worker’s 
involvement in and identification with the firm so that there will be some unification of agent and 
principal and a resulting tendency for higher effort… (in the belief that) a system of high 
involvement, high rewards, and high levels of skill and information, integrated with a corporate 
strategy that relies on front-line employees’ ideas and creativity, is capable of impressive 
improvements in organizational performance.”  Analogously, in their book on incentives, Laffont 
and Martimort focus on “how the owners of firms succeed in aligning the objectives of various 
members, such as workers, supervisors, and managers, with profit maximization” (2002, p. 2).  
They emphasize that the decentralized nature of information and the cluster of transactions between 
the principal and the agent require an interaction of cultural norms and incentives to obtain the best 
economic institutions.  Presaging our analyses of the importance of worker co-monitoring in shared 
capitalism (Freeman, Kruse, Blasi, 2007), they stress that the multitude of tasks performed by the 
worker means that “a worker is not only involved in productive tasks but also must sometimes 
                                                                                                                                                                  
  
4 
monitor his peers.”  In both cases, as well as in the analyses of others
3, the implication is that shared 
capitalist compensation needs an appropriate corporate culture to reduce free rider and moral hazard 
problems and that low intensity incentives that substitute for wages and increase worker risk would 
have problematic effects on performance. 
The other issue that theorists have identified as critical to the working of shared capitalism is 
the allocation of the risk of ownership and the problem of credit barriers keeping workers from 
becoming real capitalists.  Echoing back to Adam Smith, Stiglitz (1974) argued that the key issue in 
the use of sharecropping, as opposed to having employees renting capital, is the balance between its 
incentive effects and risk-sharing features.  Though the rental system “has greater incentive effects, 
it forces the worker to bear all the risks, and although the wage system allows the landlord, if he is 
risk neutral, to absorb all the risk, it may force heavy supervision costs on him.”  He asserted that 
the end of sharecropping was best explained by the development of capital markets that allow 
diversification of risk, capital intensity in production, and a faster rate of technological change.  
These analyses highlight the other distinct aspect of the John Bates Clark solution to the problem: 
share ownership arising from profit sharing as a way to allow workers to obtain ownership without 
taking on risk beyond their means.  Akerlof’s concept of a gift exchange carries this line of thinking 
a step further, with the exchange of ownership or profit-sharing above fixed pay for reciprocating 
effort serving as the risk-reducing mechanism for shared capitalism.  In the U.S. today, ESOPs, 
stock options, and company stock matches for contributions to retirement savings plans offer 
workers ways to get equity in their company without buying it with their savings (though there is a 
small but growing number of cases in which employees use 401(k) assets to create ESOPs). 
                                                 
3  Barnard (1938) defined incentives as involving a package of monetary and non-monetary items saying material 
incentives were too weak unless enforced by other incentives. Even the bete noir of employee empowerment, Frederick 
Taylor, argued for paying fair wages along with generous performance-based pay and careful training to keep workers 
committed to maximum effort, although consultants selling Taylorism dropped this component (Kanigel 1997). 
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  Existing research on shared capitalism has generally found better workplace performance for 
firms with profit sharing and employee ownership.
4  However, many of these studies were based on 
large administrative datasets and shed little light on the mechanisms through which shared 
capitalism functioned “inside the black box.”  Here we use new data to go inside the black box. 
 
Measures of Shared Capitalism 
  Were Clark to return to the U.S. in 2006, the first question he would ask about shared 
capitalism is the extent to which enterprises based on financial sharing and decision-making are 
found in the market—their “survival … in comparison with other systems.”   The GSS provide the 
best evidence for answering this question.  The overall prevalence of shared capitalist compensation 
is presented in Table A-1, with fuller presentation in the companion paper by Kruse, Blasi, and Park 
(2008).  For our purposes here the most important result is that 45% of the for-profit private sector 
employees in the GSS sample report participating in some kind of shared capitalism program (36% 
in profit sharing, 25% in gainsharing, 19% in employee ownership, and 11% in stock options), 
which gives us good variation for examining the relation of these programs to worker outcomes.  
The prevalence is of course higher in the NBER sample, since these firms were selected on the basis 
of having these programs. 
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism, which assigns points based on coverage 
by shared capitalism programs and the size of the financial stakes.  This index is described in 
                                                 
4 Evidence from over 60 studies indicates a positive association on average between shared capitalism programs and 
company performance, but with substantial dispersion in results (see Doucouliagos, 1995, Kruse and Blasi, 1997, and 
Kruse, 2002, for reviews; also see Black and Lynch, 2001, Boning, Ichniowski, and Shaw, 2001, Core and Guay, 2001, 
Ittner et al., 2001, Lee, 2003, Robinson and Wilson, 2006, and Sesil et al., 2002).  The average estimated increase in 
productivity associated with employee ownership and profit sharing is about 4.5%, and is maintained when using 
pre/post comparisons and attempts to control for selection bias.  
  
6 
Appendix B.  We also present results breaking out the different forms of shared capitalism types 
and intensities using the NBER data.   
 
Workplace Outcomes 
We measure six workplace outcomes: 1) turnover (looking for another job vs. staying with 
the company), 2) absenteeism, 3) workers’ perception of the discretionary effort of co-workers; 4) 
worker loyalty to the firm, 5) workers’ willingness to work hard for the firm 6) the frequency of 
suggestions to improve efficiency.  These outcomes are related to each other—e.g. looking for 
another job predicts increased absenteeism, as does reduced willingness to provide discretionary 
effort to the company, and lower loyalty. Reduced willingness to provide discretionary effort to the 
company and lower loyalty relate to looking harder for another job.  Increased absenteeism, looking 
hard for another job, and lower loyalty are linked to less discretionary effort.  Because there are 
large literatures studying most of these outcomes separately, we decided against forming an index 
of these variables and instead look at each by itself.  The summary statistics in Appendix A show 
variation in the measures among respondents in our surveys in the form of large standard 
deviations.  The absenteeism variable is the only one with a “peculiar” distribution since many 
people report zero absences while there is a long tail of persons absent for different time periods. 
We use basic multivariate statistics to assess the link between shared capitalist compensation 
and the outcomes.  We estimate OLS models of the impact of shared capitalist compensation on the 
workplace outcomes where appropriate, and ordered probit models when the outcomes have several 
values with a natural ordering (e.g., "not at all true, not very true, somewhat true, and very true"). 
Because more than half of the values of absenteeism are zero, we use the tobit model to analyze that 
outcome.  We run the regressions with the same independent variables for the national and NBER 
data sets and then probe our results in the NBER data set by adding measures of other human  
7 
resource policies that may independently affect the workplace outcomes, such as participation in an 
employee involvement team, training, and job security.   
We interpret the results from the two surveys differently in light of the difference in their 
sample designs. Since the GSS is a nationally representative survey, it will have few if any workers 
in the same firm, so that it provides information on workers across firms.  The variation in shared 
capitalist incentives and behavior reflects differences in firm policies.  By contrast, the NBER 
survey covers a representative sample of workers in a non-representative sample of firms.  To deal 
with the non-representative firm problem, we include company fixed effects in most calculations. 
This focuses on the effect of variation in shared capitalist incentives on attitudes and behavior 
within companies.  However, we analyze some ESOP variables across companies as well as within 
companies because ERISA rules require virtually all workers in a firm to be covered, so that the 
cross-firm variation in the data is potentially more informative than within-firm variation, which 
may reflect peculiarities between groups of workers within the firm.  
  Table 1 summarizes the empirical results of regression analyses of the relationship between 
the shared capitalism index and outcomes in our data sets.  It shows that in both the NBER and GSS 
surveys, the likelihood of searching for another job is lower the higher is the shared capitalism 
index.  When the controls in the national survey and in the NBER survey are the same, the 
coefficient on the index is the same.  Addition of measures of other human resource policies reduces 
the coefficient in the shared capitalism variable in the NBER data, but it still remains significant 
(line 2b). In addition, the NBER asked workers if they would turn down a higher-paying job to stay 
with their firm.  The shared capitalist index raises the likelihood that workers would do so (line 3), 
which implies that they value these policies either for the additional income they are likely to bring 
or for the stake they give workers in the company.  
8 
The NBER survey asked workers how many days they were absent in the previous six 
months – a question that was not included on the GSS.  Here, the estimate in line 4 of Table 1 
shows that the shared capitalism index alone—without looking at the impact of the firm’s corporate 
culture—raises absences.  This is the only outcome variable that is adversely associated with the 
index.  Why?  Reviewing absenteeism and turnover research, Johns (2002) emphasizes that 
persistent absenteeism signals a break in the psychological contract of trust and deeper problems in 
the corporate culture.  This perspective sees absenteeism as part of a withdrawal continuum 
involving lateness-absenteeism-lack of loyalty-intended turnover-ultimate withdrawal of 
membership in the firm. Thus, the finding that shared capitalism has a different effect on 
absenteeism than on prospective turnover, loyalty and other factors runs against the basic analysis 
of absenteeism.  Studies of the relation between unionism, which also reduces turnover, however, 
often also find a positive association with absences.  It may be that a greater sense of job security 
underlies both results.  Another possibility is that absenteeism is a form of free riding that avoids 
co-worker scrutiny and criticism.  Yet another possibility, which we explore later, is that the result 
is related to interactions with other firm policies and corporate culture. 
  Both the GSS and the NBER surveys ask workers how hard they believe their co-workers 
work.  The estimates show that perceptions of co-worker effort are significantly positively related to 
the shared capitalism index, though the NBER result is no longer significant after controlling for 
several human resource policies (lines 5, 7). The NBER survey has two other measures that reflect 
perceptions of the extent to which co-workers are committed to the firm: the extent to which co-
workers have enough interest in company issues to get involved in the firm, and whether co-
workers generally encourage each other to make extra efforts.  Again, the results show that shared 
capitalist programs raise the likelihood that workers report positively on these outcomes, both 
before and after controlling for human resource policies (lines 8-9).   
9 
  Interpretation of the positive coefficients of a worker's receipt of shared capitalist 
compensation in predicting their perceptions of the work attitudes of co-workers is not, however, 
simple in the presence of the company dummy variables.  The regressions reflect how workers paid 
with shared capitalist compensation view their fellow workers (with a glow) rather than how shared 
capitalism affects the workplace.  Since we have many establishments or facilities within firms, 
they could also be telling us that facilities with greater shared capitalist compensation have workers 
who are willing to do more for the firm.  One way to deal with this issue is to eliminate the 
company dummies from the regressions.  This strengthens the estimated effects.  Another way to 
deal with the problem is to aggregate the data by facilities so that we relate the average shared 
capitalism index at a workplace to the average perception of co-worker effort within that worksite.  
This asks the question most relevant to our analysis: whether respondents perceive greater effort in 
worksites with more shared capitalism, rather than whether workers with greater personal shared 
capitalist compensation perceive greater effort in their fellow workers.  Figures 1 to 3 display the 
scatter plot of observations for the site averages and the regression line for them.  They show that 
the shared capitalist index at a worksite is positively associated with workers saying that co-workers 
give greater effort to the firm. 
  Finally, we turn from perceptions of how co-workers behave to questions in which workers 
report on their own attitudes and behavior and relate these responses to the workers’ own shared 
capitalist compensation. Both surveys asked questions relating to worker loyalty.  The GSS asked if 
workers were proud to be working for their employer: shared capitalism raises positive responses on 
this item (line 6).  The NBER asked about loyalty to the firm: this measure is positively related to 
the shared capitalism index before and after controlling for high-performance policies in the NBER 
survey (line 10).  The NBER survey also asked how willing workers would be to work harder to 
help the company, and the frequency with which they make suggestions about improving the  
10
workplace.  The higher the shared capitalist index the more likely are workers to say that they 
themselves would work hard for the firm (line 11), and the more likely are workers to say that they 
make many suggestions (line 12). 
Particular programs 
  The NBER survey contains sufficiently detailed information and a large enough sample to 
allow us to disaggregate the shared capitalist index into its component parts to see which policies or 
programs contribute more/less to the estimated effects in Table 1.  Table 2 gives the results of these 
calculations for variables in which the individual reports on their own behavior or attitudes. Column 
1 shows that the likelihood of not searching for a new job is strongly related to profit sharing and 
gain sharing eligibility, employee ownership, and having a larger stock option grant last year, and 
that workers who receive individual bonuses are also less likely to look for another job.   
Column 2 shows that the aberrant finding that shared capitalism increases absenteeism is 
higher among those who are eligible for profit sharing and who hold stock options.  This goes 
against the findings of lower absenteeism in profit sharing companies in UK and French firms 
(Wilson and Peel, 1991; Brown et al., 1999) and with a study of U.S. firms that found employee 
ownership alone did not affect absenteeism (Hammer, Landau, and Stern 1981) though it is 
consistent with the finding by Brown et al. that absenteeism increased slightly when profit sharing 
was introduced after employee ownership.  The regression finding that absenteeism is lower among 
those who are eligible for individual bonuses lends some support to the possibility that higher 
absenteeism among those paid by group incentives reflects free rider behavior.   
  The next two columns show that loyalty and willingness to work hard are positively related 
to the size of the profit-sharing and gain sharing bonuses, and to holding employer stock purchased 
through a 401(k) plan or on the open market (cols. 3-4).  Loyalty is also positively linked to 
receiving a stock option grant last year, while willingness to work hard is linked to the size of one's  
11
ESOP stake.  The frequency with which workers report making suggestions is, by contrast, 
significantly related only to employee ownership (col. 5).   
  Overall, the forms of shared capitalism that appear to have the strongest effects on outcomes 
are profit sharing and employee ownership.  
  The bottom panels in Table 2 disaggregate the ownership variable and report coefficients 
when the company dummy is removed from the regression.  The results for the disaggregation of 
the shared capitalism index show that the largest ownership impacts come with 401k plans and 
when workers buy shares on the open market.  The sizable 401k effect compared to the ESOP 
ownership effect may reflect the greater individual ownership of the 401k (although the company 
stock match for which workers do not pay with their savings in 401k plans is comparable to an 
ESOP)  while the impact of buying shares on the open market may reflect individual’s positive 
assessment of the future of the firm.  Finally, the regressions that exclude company dummies to pick 
up differences in shared capitalist compensation across companies as well as across facilities and 
individuals within facilities find stronger ESOP effects than the regressions that include the 
company dummy variables.   
ComplementaritiesÆ Corporate Culture? 
A critical issue in analysing a distinct organizational or institutional form is whether its 
impact on behavior and outcomes operates independently of other practices or policies or whether 
its impact depends interactively on them.  The thrust of theoretical analysis of shared capitalist 
compensation, from Clark to the present, is that changing the monetary incentives by itself is 
unlikely to occur or work well independent of other policies.  Firms that introduce profit sharing or 
employee ownership must give workers the authority to make decisions that increase performance  
12
to change their behavior in ways that raise output and profits.
5  Research on “high performance 
work systems” have found that they work best as a package of complementary policies regarding 
recruitment, training/information, performance management/sharing, and work redesign, and so on.
6 
Based on these considerations and evidence we expect that shared capitalist incentives should also 
work better when combined with other firm policies.   
To examine the interaction or complementarity of shared capitalist compensation with high-
performance workplace policies, we constructed an index of high-performance work policies that 
gives one point each for being in an employee involvement team, receiving formal training in the 
past 12 months, and having high job security.
7  We interacted this index with the shared capitalism 
index in regressions for the likelihood of searching for a new job, absenteeism, loyalty to the firm, 
willingness to work harder, and frequency of suggestions.  In addition, we examined the interaction 
between shared capitalism and a measure of employer supervision of employees.  Evidence 
presented in our companion paper (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, 2008) shows that workers covered 
by more shared capitalist policies are less closely supervised than others, suggesting that shared 
capitalism substitutes for supervision in motivating workers. Combining shared capitalism with 
                                                 
5 Research often finds an interaction between participation and ownership on output but most data sets contain little 
information on the mechanisms for this.  The General Accounting Office study (1987), which matched survey data with 
records on company finances, found an interaction between employee participation in management and employee 
ownership on productivity, as did the U.S. National Institute of Mental Health study (Rosen, Klein, and Young 1986) 
and its follow up study (Rosen and Quarry 1987).  Freeman and Dube (2002) found that employee involvement had a 
larger impact on indicators of worker productivity, job satisfaction, and attitudes toward the firm than did participation 
in financial rewards, but that the highest outcomes occurred when firms combined pay for company/group performance, 
ownership stake in the firm, and employee involvement committees. Analyzing UK establishments, Conyon and 
Freeman (2001) found that the companies that adopted profit sharing, employee ownership, and broad stock option 
schemes had higher productivity and more information and decision sharing practices.  Studies of ESOPs and other 
forms of employee ownership generally find a positive relationship between ownership and performance (Levine 1995: 
81) that is strongest with worker participation. 
6 Ichniowski et al. 1996; Ichniowski and Shaw 1997; Huselid, Jackson, and Schuler 1997; Becker and Huselid 1998; 
and Becker, Huselid, and Ulrich 2001. Cappelli and Neumark found that high performance work practices such as self-
directed work teams only significantly predicted increased productivity when combined with profit/gain sharing 
(1999:34).  
7   We experimented with indices that also included measures of information sharing, job rotation, and rigorous 
selection and obtained similar results.  We focus on the index based on employee involvement, training, and job 
security since the sample sizes are smaller for job rotation and rigorous selection, and the grade of the company on 
sharing information reflects an employee evaluation of the policy's success rather than the existence of a policy.  
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close supervision may reduce the effect of shared capitalism by sending a mixed message to 
employees:  "We want you to work harder and be more committed to the company because of your 
(profit share/employer stock/stock options), but we're still going to keep a close eye on you."   
Finally, we also examine whether the extent to which shared capitalism substitutes for fixed 
wages may also be an important determinant of its effects.  We expect that employees will react 
better to shared capitalist compensation when it is a gift-exchange add-on to existing compensation, 
rather than a substitute for which they sacrifice certain income flows for greater risk in 
compensation.  While we do not have measures of alternative wages available to employees, the 
NBER survey asked how employees’ fixed wages compare to market levels, from which we 
constructed a dummy variable indicating that the worker feels s/he is paid at or above market levels.  
We interact this variable with the shared capitalist index as well. 
Table 3 summarizes the results of these calculations.  The regression coefficients on the 
interaction terms show that other firm policies measured by the high performance practice index 
affects the impact of shared capitalism—representing possible complementarities on most outcome 
variables—and that supervision intensity and wage relative to market wage also have some 
interactive effects.  Column 1 shows that the positive effect of shared capitalism on not searching 
for a new job exists only for those who are covered by the high performance policies and reveals a 
strong negative interaction of shared capitalism with close supervision. While column 2 finds no 
significant interactions for any of the three new variables with the shared capitalism index in 
affecting absenteeism, the high performance indicator reduces absences while close supervision 
raises them.  With these variables and interactions the strong positive relation between shared 
capitalism and absenteeism is weakened and no longer significantly different from zero, suggesting 
that the effect found in Table 1 may be masking that of high performance, supervision, and pay 
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relative to market.  Columns 3 and 4 show substantial shared capitalism interactions on loyalty and 
willingness to work hard.  These outcomes are enhanced when shared capitalism is combined with 
high performance policies and fixed pay at or above the market level, and are hurt when shared 
capitalism is combined with close supervision.   
Finally, column 5 shows that shared capitalism has a negative interaction with high 
performance policies and a positive link to supervision in affecting frequency of suggestions.  The 
positive effect of shared capitalist policies among workers who are not covered by high 
performance policies might reflect the fact that those in high performance work places already have 
the means and motivation to provide suggestions.  One interpretation of the positive interaction with 
supervision is that shared capitalism provides motivation to closely supervised workers to try to 
make changes in their work environment to relieve supervisory intensity.  Whether these or other 
explanations account for the observed interactions, the important point is that the interactions are 
substantial, implying that analyses that treat shared capitalist compensation as a single innovation 
will invariably miss some of the ways in which it works and the conditions for it to work 
successfully. 
As a graphic demonstration of the importance of the interactions, we show in Figure 4 the 
relation between workers’ likelihood of looking to leave the firm with the shared capitalist index 
contingent on different values of the interacting variables.
8  Each line shows how the potential 
leaving variable changes with shared capitalism given the specified interaction.  What is striking is 
the fanning out of the lines.  Shared capitalism increases likely turnover when workers are very 
closely supervised and are not covered by any high performance policies (top line)—this may 
                                                 
8  To enable a more straightforward interpretation, Figure 1 is based not on an ordered probit but on a linear probability 
regression with the same independent variables as in col. 1 of Table 5 , with the dummy dependent variable taking the 
value of 1 if a worker said s/he is very likely to look for a new job with another organization or is already looking, and 0 
otherwise.  This regression closely reflected the pattern of results in Table 5. 
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reflect workers becoming cynical and wanting to leave when they learn that management espouses a 
shared capitalism philosophy but still treats them like ordinary employees.   In contrast, shared 
capitalism decreases likely turnover when workers have average or low levels of supervision, or are 
covered by high performance policies.  The strongest effects of shared capitalism are when it is 
combined with high performance policies and low levels of supervision, causing likely turnover to 
be cut from 12.8% to 2.4% as the shared capitalism index goes from 0 to 10 (bottom line of Figure 
4).  The average results shown in Table 2 reflect these diverse effects, weighted by the proportion of 
workers in the various interactive categories. 
Finally, we view the interactions shown in Table 3 and Figure 4 as suggesting that the 
concept of “corporate culture” may provide a useful way to understand the relation between shared 
capitalism and the workplace outcomes.  Analysts sometimes use the corporate culture term loosely 
without any operational measurement/definition that risks making it a catch-all phrase to describe 
residuals or puzzles.  But when interaction or complementarity effects are demonstrably important, 
it seems natural to think that some underlying latent variable – corporate culture – may more 
usefully describe reality than analyses of separate interacting variables. 
Worker views 
As an alternative way to assess the impacts of shared capitalist incentives and of their 
interrelation with other aspects of corporate policy/culture, we asked workers the following 
hypothetical question on the NBER survey: 
To what extent would each of the following affect your motivation to improve the business 
success of the company?
 9 
You receive a cash incentive 
The company grants you stock options 
You receive some stock in the company ESOP 
You can buy some company shares in the ESPP 
                                                 
9  Employees were asked the stock options, ESOP, and ESPP questions only if the company provided these programs, 
and were asked the open market purchase questions only if they worked in a public company.  
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You buy some company shares in the open market  
 
The upper panel of Table 4 reports the responses to these questions.  Close to three-fourths 
of workers said that their motivation would be improved to a "great" or "very great" extent by 
receiving a cash incentive (78%) or stock options (77%), while about two-thirds of workers said the 
same about receiving ESOP stock (69%) or buying shares through an ESPP (63%), and less than 
one-third said this about buying company stock on the open market (30%).  This pattern fits well in 
an analysis of risk in employee response to shared capitalism, with the cash incentive and options 
being the least risky forms of compensation, and buying shares in the open market placing the 
workers’ capital at greatest risk.  The small response to buying shares in the open market conflicts, 
however, with the significant impacts of that activity on some of the outcome variables in Table 2.     
To see whether worker responses to the hypothetical are influenced by other aspects of 
company policy/practice, we estimated ordered probit regressions using the variables found to have 
important interactions with the shared capitalism index in Table 3.  The results of these regressions, 
summarized at the bottom of Table 4, show positive effects of the high performance policy index in 
four of the five questions (cols. 2-5), supporting the notion of a major complementarity between 
high performance policies and shared capitalist compensation.  Three of the regressions show 
positive effects of having fixed pay at or above market levels (cols. 2, 4, and 5), likewise supporting 
a complementarity, but only one regression shows a negative effect of closer supervision (col. 2).   
The regression that shows a different pattern from all others is the one assessing the effects of 
receiving a cash incentive (col. 1). In this case, close supervision and perceiving one's pay as below 
market raises its impact.  The positive supervision interaction may be because workers believe that 
they are more likely to receive the incentive if their supervisor pays close attention to their effort.  
The stronger effect among those with below-market pay may reflect the view that cash incentives 
can help make up the perceived pay gap more quickly than by receiving company stock.  Finally,  
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we note that the ease of seeing how well co-workers work positively affects each response, 
supporting the idea that an environment of worker co-monitoring is a component in the 
effectiveness of shared capitalism plans. 
Additional issues 
  Our analysis cannot rule out some potentially different interpretations of the results.  The 
first is that the findings reflect the selectivity of workers into shared capitalist enterprises rather than 
or in addition to their response to the way those firms operate.  Selectivity could affect the analyses 
of workers in shared capitalist firms versus others in the GSS survey and would limit generalizing 
the NBER results to workers who do not work in such firms.  Even within a firm, moreover, there 
may be something special about those who choose greater participation in shared capitalism—for 
instance, by buying stock through an ESPP or 401(k)—or who management places in positions with 
more shared capitalist incentives.  To get some notion of the possible effects of worker selectivity 
on our results, we examined the sensitivity of the results to two possible factors that might be 
associated with self-selection of workers into shared capitalism: a measure of self-rated risk 
aversion, and family wealth.   Neither of these variables made noticeable changes in the relationship 
of the shared capitalism index either alone or with interactions to the outcomes in Tables 2 and 3.   
A second problem relates to the selectivity of firms into our NBER sample and the 
endogeneity of the decision to offer shared capitalist compensation in both the NBER and GSS 
samples.  Since our NBER results hold constant firm policies and characteristics by comparing 
workers with greater and lesser shared capitalism in the same firm, we doubt that they are seriously 
affected by selectivity of firms, but there is the selectivity or endogeneity of the specific policies 
that the firms have chosen, which still makes causal interpretations of the type we have offered open 
to criticism.   In addition, because the NBER sample does not include firms with no shared capitalist  
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arrangements and is based on firms’ willingness to participate, we cannot rule out serious selectivity 
problems along the firm dimension that might interact with other factors. 
 Even  substantial  selectivity among workers or firms, however, does not gainsay the 
importance of shared capitalist compensation, for it is presumably the interaction between shared 
capitalist incentives and mode of operating and worker characteristics that underlies the selectivity 
of workers, and the interaction between other firm policies and their choice of shared capitalist 
compensation that underlies the selectivity of firms.  What selectivity does is weaken our ability to 
infer what might happen if additional firms adopted shared capitalist arrangements from the 
successes of existing firms with those practices. 
   
Conclusion 
  The principal finding of this paper is that shared capitalism affects workplace performance.  
The robustness of the finding is increased by the fact that the results from the NBER sample are 
broadly similar to the results from the nationally-representative GSS.  Shared capitalism is linked to 
lower turnover and greater loyalty and willingness to work hard, particularly when combined with 
high-performance policies, low levels of supervision, and fixed pay at or above market levels. 
Workplaces where workers average more shared capitalist compensation report greater employee 
effort along several dimensions.  The only outcome with which shared capitalist compensation is 
adversely related is absenteeism, but this result largely disappears when controlling for interactions 
with high performance policies and closeness of supervision.   
Looking at particular programs, the strongest effects of shared capitalism are for profit 
sharing and gain sharing. The largely positive results are corroborated by worker views:  most 
workers report that cash incentives, stock options, ESOP stock, and ESPP participation motivate 
them to work harder. The less risky forms of shared capitalist programs– profit sharing, gain  
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sharing, stock options, and ESOPs – have greater effects than the riskier programs in line with 
concerns about workers being averse to risking their own capital.   (For a closer look at the role of 
objective and subjective risk in shared capitalism program, see the companion paper by Blasi, 
Kruse, and Markowitz, 2008.)   
Finally, we find important interactions between shared capitalist programs and other aspects 
of company policies that affect workplace performance.  High performance policies are positively 
linked to good workplace outcomes, and are driven by certain types of shared capitalism. This 
evidence, combined with our companion paper that finds that shared capitalism increases worker 
monitoring (Freeman, Kruse, and Blasi 2008), challenges the critique that the motivations of the 
average worker interfere with the introduction of basic shared capitalism principles. The interaction 
of the effects of shared capitalism with other corporate policies suggests that the various shared 
capitalist and other policies may operate through a latent variable, “corporate culture.”  Practically 
speaking, the most important implication of this paper is that shared capitalism and high 
performance policies appear to work together, with greater impacts when they are combined than 
when they are used separately.  
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Shared capitalism index (GSS):  8-point index with one point each for profit sharing 
eligibility, gain sharing eligibility, owning any company stock, holding any stock options, 
receiving a profit sharing bonus in the past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past 
year, having an above-median profit- and gain sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and having 
an above-median company stock holding as a percent of pay.  Mean=1.48, s.d.=2.14, 
n=1919 
 
Shared capitalism index (NBER):  10-point index with all items in GS index, plus one 
point each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median 
stock option holdings as a percent of pay.  Mean=3.60, s.d.=2.65, n=40522 
 
Profit sharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Company profits or 
performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.372, n=2184, NBER mean=.713, n=41018 
 
Profit sharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to profit sharing, answer to "What 
was the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent 
year of bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  GSS mean=.024, s.d.=.066, 
n=1944, NBER mean=.068, s.d.=.124, n=40485 
 
Gainsharing (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of performance-
based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  What does 
the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Workgroup or department 
performance" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.257, n=2184, NBER mean=.207, n=41023 
 
Gainsharing as % of pay (GSS and NBER):  If "yes" to gainsharing, answer to "What was 
the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent year of 
bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. GSS mean=.017, s.d.=.061, n=2013, 
NBER mean=.033, s.d.=.106, n=40767 
 
Individual bonus (GSS and NBER):  "In your job are you eligible for any type of 
performance-based pay, such as individual or group bonuses, or any type of profit-sharing?  
What does the size of these performance-based payments depend on?  Individual 
performance" (0=no, 1=yes).  GSS mean=.290, n=2184, NBER mean=.290, n=41019 
 
Individual bonus as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to individual bonus, answer to "What was 
the approximate total dollar value of the payment(s) you received [in the most recent year of 
bonuses]?" divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0.  Mean=.050, s.d.=.125, n=40547 
 
Hold employer stock (GSS):  "Do you own any shares of stock in the company where you 




Employer stock as % of pay (GSS):  If "yes" to "hold employer stock," answer to "Please 
give a general estimate of how much cash you would get if all this stock were sold today?" 
divided by annual earnings, otherwise 0, mean=.111, s.d.=.977, n=2186 
   
Hold employer stock (NBER):  Any employer stock held through ESOP, Employee Stock 
Purchase Plan, 401(k), exercised stock options, or open market purchases (0=no, 1=yes), 
mean=.640, n=41206 
 
Employer stock as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold employer stock," the sum of 
answers to questions about value of stock held in different plans, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0. NBER mean=.398, s.d.=.808, n=40367 
 
Hold stock options (GSS and NBER):  "Do you currently hold any stock options in your 
company (vested or unvested)?" (0=no, 1=yes), GSS mean=.123, n=2188, NBER 
mean=.219, n=41166. 
 
Stock options as % of pay (NBER):  If "yes" to "Hold stock options," the sum of answers 
to questions about value of vested and unvested stock, divided by basepay+overtime, 
otherwise 0. NBER mean=.395, s.d.=1.490, n=40922 
 
ESOP (NBER):  Participant in ESOP (0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.081, n=41109 
 
ESOP stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in ESOP, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.067, s.d.=.417, n=41002 
 
ESPP (NBER):  Hold stock purchased through Employee Stock Purchase Plan (0=no, 
1=yes),  mean=.176, n=41169 
 
ESPP stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in Employee Stock Purchase Plan, 
divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.078, s.d.=.304, n=41168 
 
401(k) stock (NBER):  Hold employer stock in 401(k) plan (0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.335, 
n=40885 
 
401(k) stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held in 401(k) plan, divided by 
basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.189, s.d.=.525, n=40730 
 
Stock from exercised options as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock held from exercised 
options, divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.052, s.d.=.396, n=40956 
 
Stock from exercised options (NBER):  Hold employer stock from exercised options 
(0=no, 1=yes),  mean=.050, n=41032 
 
Open mkt. stock as % of pay (NBER):  Employer stock purchased on open market, 
divided by basepay+overtime, otherwise 0,  mean=.019, s.d.=.165, n=41144 
 
Open mkt. stock (NBER):  Hold stock purchased on open market (0=no, 1=yes),  





Not likely to search for new job (GSS):  "How likely is it that you will decide to look hard 
for a job with another organization within the next twelve months?" (1-3 scale, Very 
likely/Somewhat likely/ Not at all likely), mean=2.37, s.d.=.79, n=2400. 
 
Not likely to search for new job (NBER):  "How likely is it that you will decide to look 
hard for a job with another organization within the next twelve months?" (1-4 scale, Already 
looking/Very likely/Somewhat likely/ Not at all likely), mean=3.42, s.d.=.83, n=40722 
 
Would turn down another job for more pay to stay with this company (NBER):  “To 
what extent do you agree or disagree with this statement? ‘I would turn down another job for 
more pay in order to stay with this company.’” (1-5 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly 
agree), mean=1.75, s.d.=1.14, n=1175. 
 
Absenteeism (NBER): "About how many days have you been absent from work in the last 
6 months (not counting vacation)?"  mean=1.77, s.d.=7.66, n=39582 
 
Co-workers work hard (GSS and NBER):  “At your workplace, how hard would you say 
that people work?” (0-10 scale, 0=not at all hard, 10=very hard), GSS mean=6.93, s.d.=2.42, 
n=2386, NBER mean=7.07, s.d.=2.10, n=40738. 
 
Proud to be working for employer (GSS):  “I am proud to be working for my employer.” 
(1-4 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 4=strongly agree), mean=3.19, s.d.=.69, n=2401. 
 
Co-workers have enough interest in company issues to get involved (NBER):  “People at 
[company] have too little interest in company-wide issues to get involved in them.” (1-7 
scale, 1=strongly agree, 7=strongly disagree), mean=4.22, s.d.=1.60, n=40563. 
 
Co-workers generally encourage each other to make extra effort (NBER):  “At your 
workplace, would you say employees generally ENCOURAGE each other to make an extra 
effort on the job, DISCOURAGE each other from making an extra effort, or would you say 
they DON'T CARE how hard other employees work? (-1=discourage, 0=don't care, 
1=encourage), mean=.74, s.d.=.48, n=13314. 
 
Loyalty to company (NBER):  "How much loyalty would you say you feel toward the 
company you work for as a whole?" (1-4 scale, No loyalty at all/ Only a little/Some/ A lot), 
mean=3.34, s.d.=.80, n=40091 
 
Willing to work harder to help company (NBER): "To what extent do you agree or 
disagree with this statement? 'I am willing to work harder than I have to in order to help the 
company I work for succeed?'" (1-5 scale, 1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree), 
mean=4.02, s.d.=.90, n=40712 
 
Frequency of suggestions (NBER):  "How often have you taken such ideas [for making 
your department or company more effective] to someone in the company in the past?" 





High performance policy index (NBER)(index mean=1.77, s.d.=.86, n=37125):  Additive 
index of: 
 
a)  Employee involvement team:  "Some companies have organized workplace decision-
making in ways to get more employee input and involvement.  Are you personally 
involved in any team, committee or task force that addresses issues such as product 
quality, cost cutting, productivity, health and safety, or other workplace issues?" 
(0=no, 1=yes), mean=.347, n=40122 
b)  Formal training: "In the last 12 months have you received any formal training from 
your current employer, such as in classes or seminars sponsored by the employer?" 
(0=no, 1=yes), mean=.564, n=40460 
c)  Job security: "Thinking about the next twelve months, how likely do you think it is 
that you will lose your job or be laid off?" (coded for scale as 0=very likely or fairly 
likely, 1=not too likely or not at all likely), mean=.843, n=38510 
  
  How closely supervised (NBER): "Are you closely supervised, or do you work fairly 
independently of close supervision?" (0-10 scale, 0=independent of close supervision, 10= 
closely supervised), mean=3.35, s.d.=2.63, n=40845    
 
Fixed pay at or above market (NBER): "Do you believe your fixed annual wages in 
calendar year 2002 were higher or lower than those of employees with similar experience 
and job descriptions in other companies in your region?" (rated on scale of 1=lower to 
5=higher, recoded for this variable as 0=less than 3, 1=3 or greater), mean=594, n=35860 
 
Ease of seeing how well coworker is working (NBER): "In your job how easy is it for you 
to see whether your co-workers are working well or poorly?  Please rate on a scale of  0 to 
10" (0=not at all easy, 10=very easy), mean=6.81, s.d.=2.73, n=40791  
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APPENDIX B:  The shared capitalist thermometer index 
  As a first step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee outcomes, we 
constructed a thermometer-style index of shared capitalism.  This index assigns one point each 
when the worker was covered by any of the shared capitalist forms of compensation about which 
the survey asked, with additional points for recent bonuses or grants, and for large bonuses or stock 
holdings.  For questions with a continuous numeric answer, we gave the item a value of 1 if the 
respondent had a value greater than the median value.  Because there is no natural ordering of 
shared capitalist systems in the sense that a firm first introduces profit-sharing, then adds employee 
ownership, and then gain-sharing, the index is not a Guttman scale.  It is a simple summated rating 
(Bartholomew et al, 2002; Bartholomew, 1996), using dichotomous scoring. 
  In the GSS, there are eight variables in the index: profit sharing eligibility, gain sharing 
eligibility, owning any company stock, holding stock options, receiving a profit sharing bonus in the 
past year, receiving a gain sharing bonus in the past year, having an above-median profit- and gain 
sharing bonus as a percent of pay, and having an above-median company stock holding as a percent 
of pay.  In the NBER data there are ten variables in the index: all of the above items plus one point 
each for receiving a stock option grant in the past year, and having above-median stock option 
holdings (including unvested options if they could be exercised today) as a percent of pay.   
  Indices of this style have both advantages and disadvantages. On the plus side, they provide 
a quick and ready measure of the extent of shared capitalist arrangements that makes it easy to 
compare results across surveys and to summarize the broad thrust of findings.  Since our firm 
surveys covered only firms with some shared capitalist arrangements, the index allows us to 
differentiate workers with differing degrees of incentive to their firm’s programs.  On the negative 
side, the index treats different programs the same even though they potentially have different effects 
on particular outcomes.  It postulates a single scale with equal weights rather than using factor  
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analysis or other statistical modelling to obtain weights for given factors.   To deal with these 
problems, in Table 2 we also estimated the relationship of the outcomes to the different types of 
shared capitalism, introduced as dummy or continuous variables in regressions.
10  By comparing the 
results using the shared capitalism index to the results using the disaggregated measures, we can 
assess the loss of information due to the amalgamation of the measures into a single index.  
  Figure B1 shows the distribution of our shared capitalism index in the GSS.  This survey 
estimates that 40% of US workers have some form of shared capitalist program.  This estimate is 
close to that obtained by Dube and Freeman in the WRPS.  The mean score of the index is 1.48 – a 
figure greatly affected by the substantial number of workers without shared capitalism systems.  
Conditional on having a program, most workers report scores in the range of 2 to 5, with 6% 
reporting scores of 6 or greater.  Figure B2 gives the distribution of the index in the NBER survey 
data.  It also shows a non-normal distribution, with the most common scores as 2 to 4 but a sizeable 
number of workers scoring 7 or above.  There is sufficient variation in the index to differentiate the 
extent of the shared capitalist “treatment” on workers. 
                                                 
10 There are statistical techniques to deal with the formation of latent variable indices from questions of the sort that we 
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Co-workers work hard  (1-10 scale) = 6.765 + 0.087 (shared capitalist index) 
                (.125)     (.043) 
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Co-workers work interest in firm  (1-10 scale) = 3.580 + 0.173 (shared capitalist index) 
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Co-workers encourage others (1-10 scale) = 0.572 + 0.043 (shared capitalist index) 
                                                 (.073)    (.020)     
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   TABLE 1:  Relation of Shared Capitalism to Workplace Outcomes          
                      
Each row represents results of separate regression.                         
        Coeff. (s.e.) of        Controls       
         shared capitalism  Job and      Job    
         index      demog.  EI team  Training security  N 
Dependent variables                         
TURNOVER                  
 National  data               
1    Not likely to search for new job  0.039 ** (0.017) x        1743
      (1-3 scale, ordered probit)               
                      
  NBER company data               
2a    Not likely to search for new job  0.039 *** (0.004) x     39132
2b      (1-4 scale, ordered probit)  0.018 *** (0.005) x x  x  x  35644
3a    Would turn down another job for more pay to  0.059 **  (0.027) x     1086
3b      stay with this co. (1-5 scale, ordered probit)  0.062 **  (0.028) x x  x  x  1079
                      
ABSENTEEISM             
  NBER company data             
4a    Number of days absent in past 6 mos. (tobit)  0.152 *** (0.056) x     38069
4b         0.161 *** (0.057) x x  x  x  34834
               
JOB EFFORT AND LOYALTY               
 National  data               
5    Co-workers work hard  0.116 *** (0.026) x     1741
      (1-10 scale, OLS)               
6    Proud to be working for employer  0.056 *** (0.014) x     1745
      (1-4 scale, ordered probit)               
                      
  NBER company data               
7a    Co-workers work hard   0.018 **  (0.007) x     39252
7b      (1-10 scale, OLS)  0.006   (0.008) x x  x  x  35653
                      
8a    Co-workers have enough interest in company  0.027 *** (0.005) x     38980
8b      Issues to get involved (1-7 scale, OLS)  0.014 **  (0.006) x x  x  x  35518
(cont.)                      
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9a    Co-workers generally encourage each other to  0.038 *** (0.008) x     12799
9b      make extra effort (0-1, OLS)  0.029 *** (0.009) x x  x  x  12537
                      
10a         Loyalty toward co.  0.041 *** (0.004) x     38514
10b      (1-4 scale, ordered probit)  0.021 *** (0.005) x x  x  x  35082
                      
11a    Willing to work harder to help co.  0.023 *** (0.004) x     39159
11b      (1-5 scale, ordered probit)  0.015 *** (0.004) x x  x  x  35595
                     
12a    Frequency of suggestions  0.035 *** (0.005) x     29965
12b      (1-5 scale, ordered probit)  0.027 *** (0.005) x x  x  x  26860
 
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01    Coefficients in bold are significant at p<.05 
See Appendix A for variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
Job and demographic controls include age, sex, race, tenure, occupation, education, full-time status, and ease of seeing co-workers for all regressions for all 
regressions.  The national data regressions also include work in a team and ln(yearly earnings), and the NBER regressions also include management level (3 
dummies), supervisory status, union membership, disability status, payment on an hourly rate, country effects (21 dummies), closeness of supervision, 




  Table 2: Workplace Outcomes Related to Type of Shared Capitalism Plan      
                                               
  Dep var.:  Not likely to                    Willing to      Suggestion   
     search for new job    Absenteeism  Loyalty      work harder      frequency     
      (ordered          (ordered     (ordered    (ordered     
      probit)     (Tobit)     probit)     probit)     probit)     
      (1)       (2)       (3)        (4)     (5)      
Bonuses                           
  Profit sharing    0.096 (0.021) *** 0.929 (0.268) *** 0.011  (0.021)    0.039 (0.019) **  0.034 (0.023)   
 
Profit sharing bonus as % of base 
pay 0.175 (0.100) *  0.529 (1.346)     0.546  (0.107) *** 0.436 (0.095) *** -0.091 (0.132)   
 Gainsharing      0.085 (0.028) *** 0.489 (0.360)     0.015  (0.028)    0.034 (0.026)    0.021 (0.034)   
  Gainsharing bonus as % of base pay  0.095 (0.114)    -4.117 (1.559) *** 0.203  (0.123)    0.266 (0.109) **  -0.114 (0.199)   
 Individual  bonus  0.082 (0.027) *** -0.975 (0.342) *** 0.143 (0.027) *** 0.063 (0.025) *** 0.004 (0.032)    
  Indiv. bonus as % of base pay  0.012 (0.117)    -0.364 (1.602)    -0.100  (0.124)    0.128 (0.111)    0.152 (0.188)   
Stock  options                           
  Stock option holding  0.111 (0.059) *  1.583 (0.715) **  -0.140  (0.058) **  -0.085 (0.053)    -0.021 (0.070)   
  Stock option value as % of base pay  0.010 (0.006) *  0.085 (0.077)    0.003  (0.006)    0.002 (0.006)    -0.037 (0.032)   
  Rec'd stock option grant last year  -0.074 (0.058)    -0.633 (0.699)    0.187  (0.057) *** 0.034 (0.052)    0.028 (0.071)   
  Stock option grant as % of avg. grant  0.037 (0.014) *** 0.175 (0.165)    0.016  (0.014)    0.009 (0.012)    -0.032 (0.020)   
Employee  ownership                              
  Any employee ownership  0.072 (0.020) *** 0.347 (0.248)    0.065  (0.019) *** 0.015 (0.018)    0.166 (0.021) *** 
  Employee-owned stock as % of pay  0.001 (0.010)    -0.171 (0.127)    0.051  (0.010) *** 0.008 (0.009)    0.024 (0.014) * 
                               
n      37796    36769    37192      37817      29292   
(pseudo)  R-sq.  0.035    0.018    0.060      0.042    0.074   
Cut point 1  -0.826 (0.239)         -0.578  (0.246)  -0.858 (0.226)    1.327 (0.313)  
Cut point 2  -0.318 (0.239)         0.226  (0.246)  -0.318 (0.226)    3.560 (0.313)  
Cut point 3  0.640 (0.239)         1.381  (0.246)  0.627 (0.226)     4.117 (0.313)  
Cut point 4                             1.864 (0.226)    4.826 (0.314)   
Breakdowns by type of employee 
ownership^                           
 ESOP  0.097 (0.057) *  -0.539 (0.679)     -0.041  (0.055)    -0.091 (0.052) *  0.304 (0.064) *** 
  ESOP stock as % of pay  -0.022 (0.022)    0.105 (0.265)    0.018  (0.022)    0.053 (0.020) *** 0.034 (0.024)    
38
 ESPP  -0.013 (0.042)     0.780 (0.518)    0.047  (0.043)    0.058 (0.039)    -0.039 (0.068)   
  ESPP stock as % of pay  0.063 (0.035) * -0.519 (0.441)     0.053  (0.036)     0.029 (0.031)    -0.094 (0.114)   
  401(k) stock  0.105 (0.019) *** 0.118 (0.230)    0.111 (0.018) *** 0.072 (0.017) *** 0.115 (0.020) *** 
  401(k) stock as % of pay  0.031 (0.017) *  -0.180 (0.213)    0.087  (0.016) *** -0.011 (0.015)    -0.003 (0.021)   
  Stock from options  -0.032 (0.040)    0.810 (0.503)    0.061  (0.043)    -0.002 (0.038)    -0.012 (0.069)   
  Stock from options as % of pay  -0.040 (0.021) *  -0.176 (0.286)    0.019  (0.024)    -0.001 (0.021)    0.047 (0.073)   
  Open mkt. stock  -0.018 (0.029)    -1.146 (0.399) *** 0.089 (0.031) *** 0.072 (0.028) **  0.160 (0.052) *** 
   Open mkt. stock as % of pay  0.010 (0.049)    0.300 (0.625)    -0.031  (0.052)    0.035 (0.048)    -0.515 (0.255) ** 
ESOP coefficients without fixed effects^                               
 ESOP  0.168 (0.035) *** -0.190 (0.422)     0.186  (0.034) *** -0.001 (0.032)    -0.080 (0.038) ** 
   ESOP stock as % of pay  -0.021 (0.020)    -0.170 (0.242)    0.017  (0.020)    0.051 (0.018) *** 0.037 (0.023)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses) 
See Appendix A for variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
All regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per 
week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability 
status, ln(fixed pay), closeness of supervision, ability to observe co-workers, country effects (21 dummies), and company fixed effects. 
^ The sections labelled "Breakdown by type of employee ownership" and "ESOP coefficients without fixed effects" represent separate regressions which 
contain all of the bonus and stock option variables listed above, along with the control variables listed below.  
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    Table 3: Interactions between Company Policies and Workplace Outcomes    
                                              
  Dep var.:  Not likely to              Willing to      Suggestion   
     search for new job    Absenteeism  Loyalty      work harder      frequency   
      (ordered         (ordered    (ordered    (ordered     
      probit)     (Tobit)     probit)     probit)     probit)    
      (1)        (2)        (3)        (4)        (5)       
Shared capitalism index  0.002  (0.009)    0.064 (0.116)    -0.024 (0.009)  *** 0.017 (0.008) **  0.035 (0.012) *** 
                        
High performance policy index  0.058  (0.016) *** -0.642 (0.201) *** 0.135 (0.016) *** 0.131 (0.015) *** 0.253 (0.018) *** 
  * shared capitalism index  0.013  (0.003) *** 0.069 (0.042)    0.027 (0.003)  *** 0.008 (0.003) **  -0.015 (0.005) *** 
                          
How closely supervised  0.001  (0.005)    0.117 (0.059) **  0.001 (0.004)     0.004 (0.004)    -0.017 (0.005) *** 
  * shared capitalism index  -0.004  (0.001) *** -0.001 (0.014)    -0.005 (0.001)  *** -0.007 (0.001) *** 0.003 (0.002) ** 
                        
Fixed pay at or above market  0.373  (0.024) *** -0.268 (0.311)    0.259 (0.024) *** 0.147 (0.023) *** -0.073 (0.028) *** 
  * shared capitalism index  0.003  (0.005)    -0.028 (0.069)    0.016 (0.005)  *** 0.011 (0.005) **  0.006 (0.008)   
                          
S e l e c t e d   c o n t r o l s ^                       
  Individual bonuses (dummy)  0.087  (0.020) *** -0.782 (0.252) *** 0.083 (0.020) *** 0.104 (0.018) *** -0.009 (0.022)    
  Ease of seeing how well  -0.001  (0.003)    0.023 (0.033)  0.017 (0.003)  *** 0.031 (0.002) *** 0.031 (0.003) *** 
  c o - w o r k e r   i s   w o r k i n g                       
n     31411  30706 30920   31364 24936  
(pseudo) R-sq.  0.103  0.017 0.101   0.054 0.081  
Cut point 1  0.031  (0.269) -0.286 (0.275) -0.817 (0.254) 1.293 (0.291)  
Cut point 2  0.595  (0.269) 0.575 (0.275) -0.267 (0.254) 3.579 (0.291)  
Cut point 3   1.682  (0.269)          1.790 (0.275)     0.683 (0.254)    4.167 (0.291)   
Cut point 4      1.948 (0.254) 4.917 (0.292)  
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses) 
See Appendix A for variable definitions and descriptive statistics. 
All regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years, hours worked per 
week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, race (4 dummies), disability 





Table 4:  Employee Views of the Impact of Shared Capitalist 
Incentives on their behavior              
                                                  
     To what extent would each of the following affect your motivation to improve the         
     business success of the company?                     
     You receive a    The co. grants   
You receive 
some    You buy some    You buy some   
     cash incentive    you some    stock in the co.    co. shares    co. shares on   
     from the co.    stock options    ESOP      in the ESPP    the open mkt.   
      (1)        (2)       (3)       (4)       (5)      
Tabulation  of  responses                           
  To a very little extent  2.2%     2.3%    4.4%    5.3%     20.1%    
  To a little extent  3.0%      3.6%     5.2%     6.7%     17.8%    
  To some extent  17.2%      17.2%    20.9%    25.2%     32.4%    
  To a great extent  32.5%      31.7%    28.8%    33.8%     17.5%    
  To a very great extent  45.1%     45.2%    40.8%    29.0%     12.2%    
   n  10389        8187       3155       8151       8135      
Ordered  probit  coeffs.                           
 
High performance policy 
index  0.022 (0.015)     0.222 (0.018) *** 0.130 (0.028) *** 0.173 (0.017) *** 0.129 (0.017) ***
  How closely supervised  0.011  (0.006) **  -0.028 (0.006) *** 0.010 (0.009)     -0.004 (0.006)    -0.002 (0.006)   
 
Fixed pay at or above 
market -0.147  (0.025) *** 0.094 (0.028) *** 0.045 (0.044)     0.093 (0.027) *** 0.077 (0.026) ***
  Ease of seeing how well  0.019  (0.004) *** 0.028 (0.005) *** 0.035 (0.008) *** 0.023 (0.005) *** 0.013 (0.005) ***
  co-worker  is  working                           
n      9749     7832    2816    7798     7787    
(pseudo)  R-sq.  0.015     0.060    0.053    0.038     0.022    
Cut point 1  -2.834  (0.428)   1.859 (0.469)   -0.209 (0.710)   -0.057 (0.422)   -0.201 (0.441)  
Cut point 2  -2.436  (0.428)   2.337 (0.468)   0.246 (0.710)   0.428 (0.422)   0.349 (0.441)  
Cut point 3  -1.544  (0.428)   3.251 (0.469)   1.106 (0.710)   1.343 (0.422)   1.225 (0.441)  
Cut point 4  -0.641  (0.428)    4.196 (0.469)    1.929 (0.711)     2.279 (0.423)    1.881 (0.441)   
* p<.10  ** p<.05  *** p<.01 (s.e. in parentheses)                           
^ All regressions include controls for occupation (5 dummies), mgt. level (3 dummies), hourly pay status, supervisory status, tenure in years,   
  hours worked per week, union status, age, gender, marital status (2 dummies), family size, college graduate, graduate degree, number of kids, 
  country (21 dummies), race (4 dummies), disability status, ln(fixed pay), and company fixed effects.            
1 
Table A-1: Prevalence of Shared Capitalism Programs 
 
General NBER      Sample sizes
Social company
Survey dataset GSS NBER
2002-2006
Bonus eligibility
Profit sharing  35.9% 71.3% 2386 41018
Gainsharing 24.9% 20.7% 2386 41023
Size of most recent bonus, if eligible for any
Mean dollar value $6,265 $11,329 693 26113
Median dollar value $1,500 $2,000 693 26113
Mean % of pay 8.9% 12.1% 645 22019
Median % of pay 4.6% 5.7% 645 22019
Employee ownership
Own employer stock in any form 19.4% 64.0% 2406 41206
Own employer stock through:
Employee Stock Ownership Plan 8.1% 41109
Employee Stock Purchase Plan 17.6% 40990
401(k) plan 33.5% 40885
Exercising options and keeping stock 5.0% 41032
Open market purchase 7.3% 41145
Value of employer stock, if own stock
Dollar value:  Mean $63,130 $60,078 318 25447
                   Median $10,000 $14,375 318 25447
% of pay:     Mean 81.7% 65.0% 302 22715
                   Median 23.0% 30.6% 302 22715
% of wealth:  Mean 19.6% 23141
                   Median 10.0% 23141
Stock options
Currently hold stock options 11.3% 21.9% 2392 41166
Ever granted stock options 22.3% 41166
Granted stock options last year 20.4% 41158
Value of stock options, if hold options:
Mean dollar value of unvested options $112,882 8390
Mean dollar value of vested options $143,117 8497
Total dollar value:  Mean $249,901 8656
                           Median $75,000 8656
% of pay:             Mean 183.7% 8403
                           Median 100.0% 8403
% of wealth:         Mean 60.3% 8104
                           Median 28.6% 8104
Any of above programs 44.9% 85.7% 2430 41206  
Source: Tabulated from GSS and NBER surveys. The GSS sample is limited to private for-profit employees. 
 